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TWO STATEMENTS OF THE DUGGAN-SCHWARTZ THEOREM
EGOR IANOVSKI
Abstract. The Duggan-Schwartz theorem [Duggan and Schwartz, 1992] is a famous result
concerning strategy-proof social choice correspondences, often stated as “A social choice corre-
spondence that can be manipulated by neither an optimist nor a pessimist has a weak dictator”.
However, this formulation is actually due to Taylor [2002], and the original theorem, at face
value, looks rather different. In this note we show that the two are in fact equivalent.
1. Definitions
Definition 1.1. Let V be a finite set of voters, A a finite set of alternatives.
A profile P consists of a linear order over A (also known as a preference order or a ballot), Pi,
for every voter i. The set of all profiles of voters V over alternatives A is denoted PpV,Aq. We
use P´i to refer to the ballots of all voters except i. Hence, P “ PiP´i and P
1
i
P´i is obtained
from profile P by replacing Pi with P
1
i
.
A social choice correspondence produces a nonempty set of alternatives, F : PpV,Aq Ñ
2AztHu.
Definition 1.2. Let H ‰ W Ď A. We use bestpPi,W q to denote the best alternative in W
according to Pi, worstpPi,W q the worst.
We extend ľi into two weak orders over 2
AztHu:
(1) X ľOi Y iff bestpPi, Xq ľi bestpPi, Y q.
(2) X ľP
i
Y iff worstpPi, Xq ľi worstpPi, Y q.
A social choice correspondence is strategy-proof for optimists (SPO) if for all P 1
i
, whenever
F pPiP´iq “W and F pP
1
i
P´iq “W
1, W ľO
i
W 1. A social choice correspondence is strategy-proof
for pessimists (SPP) if for all P 1
i
, whenever F pPiP´iq “W and F pP
1
i
P´iq “W
1, W ľP
i
W 1.
Definition 1.3. Given a social choice correspondence F , a weak dictator is some i P V such
that the first choice of i is always in F pP q.
2. Proofs
Theorem 2.1 (Taylor [2002]). Let F be a social choice correspondence that satisfies SPP, SPO
and is onto with respect to singletons. That is, for every a P A there exists a P such that
F pP q “ t a u.
For |A| ě 3, F has a weak dictator.
Theorem 2.2 (Duggan and Schwartz [1992]). Let F be a social choice correspondence that is
onto with respect to singletons. That is, for every a P A there exists a P such that F pP q “ t a u.
Let each voter i be equipped with a probability function pi : PpV,Aq ˆ A ˆ 2
A Ñ r0, 1s such
that
ř
xPX pipP, x,Xq “ 1 and pipP, a,Xq ą 0 whenever a “ bestpPi, Xq or a “ worstpPi, Xq.
Suppose further that for every ui consistent with Pi (uipaq ą uipbq whenever a ąi b), and for
every P 1i , the following is true:ÿ
xPF pPiP´iq
pipPiP´i, x, F pPiP´iqquipxq ě
ÿ
xPF pP 1
i
P´iq
pipPiP´i, x, F pP
1
iP´iqquipxq.
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For |A| ě 3, F has a weak dictator.
The notion of manipulation used by Duggan and Schwartz is obviously more general than that
of Taylor, and one is thus tempted to conclude that the original theorem is weaker than Taylor’s
reformulation.1
However, this would be erroneous as the theorems, strictly speaking, are incomparable. Tay-
lor’s theorem concerns a social choice correspondence F , whereas Duggan and Schwartz’s theo-
rem applies to F together with a set of probability functions, pi. It is entirely plausible that one
could find two sets of probability functions such that F and p1, . . . , pn satisfy the hypotheses
of the Duggan-Schwartz theorem while F and p11, . . . , p
1
n do not. However, F is unchanged – it
either has a weak dictator, or it does not.
To more properly compare the two theorems, then, we need to take an existential projection
over the original Duggan-Schwartz theorem.
Theorem 2.3 (Duggan and Schwartz [1992]). Let F be a social choice correspondence that is
onto with respect to singletons. That is, for every a P A there exists a P such that F pP q “ t a u.
Suppose there exist probability functions pi : PpV,AqˆAˆ2
A Ñ r0, 1s such that
ř
xPX pipP, x,Xq “
1 and pipP, a,Xq ą 0 whenever a “ bestpPi, Xq or a “ worstpPi, Xq.
Suppose further that for every ui consistent with Pi (uipaq ą uipbq whenever a ąi b), and for
every P 1
i
, the following is true:
ÿ
xPF pPiP´iq
pipPiP´i, x, F pPiP´iqquipxq ě
ÿ
xPF pP 1
i
P´iq
pipPiP´i, x, F pP
1
iP´iqquipxq.
For |A| ě 3, F has a weak dictator.
Now we claim the two theorems are equivalent.
Proposition 2.4. F satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2.1 if and only if F satisfies the hy-
potheses of Theorem 2.3.
Proof. We will first show that if F is manipulable in the sense of Taylor it is manipulable in the
sense of Duggan-Schwartz. Pay heed to the order of the quantifiers in Theorem 2.3, as they may
appear counter-intuitive: F is strategy-proof if for some choice of probability functions, for every
choice of a utility function, voter i cannot improve his expected utility. Hence, F is manipulable
just if for every choice of probability functions we can construct some utility function giving
voter i a profitable deviation.
Suppose i can manipulate optimistically from PiP´i to P
1
i
P´i. That is:
F pPiP´iq “ X, F pP
1
iP´iq “ Y,
bestpPi, Xq “ a, bestpPi, Y q “ b,
a ăi b.
Now, let pi be any probability function in the sense of Theorem 2.3. Note that this means that
pipP, a,Xq “ ǫ and pipP, b, Y q “ δ are strictly positive. Let c P X be the next-best alternative
after a. Observe that an upper bound on the utility voter i obtains sincerely is ǫuipaq`p1´ǫquipcq,
whereas the lower bound on the utility voter i obtains from the deviation is δuipbq. All we need
to do is pick a ui that satisfies:
δuipbq ą ǫuipaq ` p1´ ǫquipcq.
It is of course easy to do so as, necessarily, uipbq ą uipaq, uipcq, and ǫ, δ are constants. For
example, let uipaq “ 1, uipcq “ 2 and uipbq “ 3{δ.
1A wider notion of manipulability implies a more narrow notion of strategy-proofness, and hence the theorem
would apply to less functions.
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Suppose i can manipulate pessimistically from PiP´i to P
1
i
P´i. That is:
F pPiP´iq “ X, F pP
1
iP´iq “ Y,
worstpPi, Xq “ a, worstpPi, Y q “ b,
a ăi b.
As before, let pi be any probability function in the sense of Theorem 2.3. This means that
pipP, a,Xq “ ǫ and pipP, b, Y q “ δ are strictly positive. Let c P X be the best alternative in the
set. Observe that an upper bound on the utility voter i obtains sincerely is ǫuipaq ` p1´ ǫquipcq,
whereas the lower bound on the utility voter i obtains from the deviation is uipbq.
2 All we need
to do is pick a ui that satisfies:
uipbq ą ǫuipaq ` p1´ ǫquipcq.
This time it is possible that uipcq ą uipbq, however 1´ǫ is strictly smaller than 1. One possibility
is uipaq “ 1, uipbq “
1{ǫ`ǫ`1
1´ǫ , uipcq “
1{ǫ`ǫ`2
1´ǫ . This leads to the following inequality, which can
be verified algebraically:
1{ǫ` ǫ` 1
1´ ǫ
ą 2ǫ` 2` 1{ǫ.
Now suppose that F is manipulable in the sense of Duggan-Schwartz. This means for every
choice of pi, there is some choice of ui such that for some choice of PiP´i and P
1
i
P´i, i’s expected
utility is higher in the insincere profile.
Pick a pi that attaches a probability of 1{2 to the best alternative in the set and 1{2 to the
worst. In other words, we have the following situation:
F pPiP´iq “ X, F pP
1
iP´iq “ Y,
bestpPi, Xq “ x1, bestpPi, Y q “ y1,
worstpPi, Xq “ x2, worstpPi, Y q “ y2,
uipx1q ` uipx2q
2
ă
uipy1q ` uipy2q
2
.
Clearly, a necessary condition for the above to hold is that either uipy1q ą uipx1q or uipy2q ą
uipx2q. That is to say, F is manipulable by either an optimist or a pessimist. 
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2b is the worst element in Y , so the utility of any other element must be at least uipbq, and pipP, y, Y q sums
to 1.
